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Abstract: We extend to natural deduction the approach of Linear
Nested Sequents and 2-sequents. Formulas are decorated with a spatial
coordinate, which allows a formulation of formal systems in the original
spirit of natural deduction—only one introduction and one elimination
rule per connective, no additional (structural) rule, no explicit refer-
ence to the accessibility relation of the intended Kripke models. We
give systems for the normal modal logics from K to S4. For the intu-
itionistic versions of the systems, we define proof reduction, and prove
proof normalisation, thus obtaining a syntactical proof of consistency.
For logics K and K4 we use existence predicates ( la Scott) for formu-
lating sound deduction rules.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 03B22, 03B45, 03F05.
ACM CCS Concepts: Theory of computation→ Proof theory; Modal and temporal
logics.
ACM Computing Classification System (1998): F.4.1.
Keywords: proof theory, natural deduction, normalization, modal logic, 2-sequents,
linear nested sequents.
1 Introduction
Proof theory of modal logics is a subtle subject, and if a sequent calculus
presentation is complex, natural deduction systems are even more difficult.
The source of this problem is well highlighted in Dag Prawitz’s foundational
book [23].
One of the most successful proof-theoretical formulations of modal log-
ics are the labelled systems of [27, 25, 21]. which extend ordinary natural
deduction by explicitly mirroring in the deductive apparatus the accessibil-
ity relation of Kripke models (see also [16, 18, 19, 17, 20, 6, 3, 5]). In a
sense, they may look like a formalization of Kripke semantics in a first-order
deductive fashion (see Section 9.1, below, for a more complete discussion).
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2Differently from the labelled systems cited above, the aim of our paper
is to define natural deduction systems for modal logics that do not explicitly
deal with the accessibility relation.
Our leading idea is to extend in a geometrical way the standard natural de-
ductive systems for classical and intuitionistic logic, in order to treat modal-
ities as first order quantifiers are treated in those systems. In doing this
we refine and extend to natural deduction some recent proposals by Lell-
mann and others for sequent calculi for modal logics [22, 11] (see later in
this introduction).
Our proposal in a nutshell
We add to formulas a kind of spatial coordinates, that we call positions, to
adapt to natural deduction the paradigm of 2–Sequents by Masini et al.,
and Linear–Nested–Sequents by Lellman et al. Main features of our systems
are the following:
– there is exactly one introduction and one elimination rule for each
modal connective;
– rules for modal connectives have the same shape as those of first order
quantifiers;
– no formalization of the first order translation of modal logic formulas
is present at the level of deduction rules (hence no formalization of the
accessibility relation appears);
– a notion of proof reduction is given and a property of normalization is
provided, following the standard definitions and techniques for natural
deduction systems;
– only modal operators can change the spatial positions of formulas.
We underline that, as was the case for 2–Sequents and Linear–Nested–
Sequents, a specific goal is not to explicitly embed the notion of accessibility
relation, thus equipping the formal systems with ad-hoc deductive rules (see
also Section 9.1).
A short history
To fully understand our proposal is useful to frame it “historically”, and
to go back to 2–Sequents, originally formulated in [15, 14]. The main idea
of these works was to add a second dimension to ordinary propositional
sequents. Each formula in a 2-Sequent lives at a level (that could be seen as
a natural number).
Such a proposal was later extended and generalized to a natural de-
duction setting. Formulas become indexed formulas, i.e. pairs of formulas
3and natural numbers, where numbers correspond explicitly to levels in 2–
Sequents. Such an idea works fine for the negative ⊥-free fragments of the
modal logics K, T, K4 and S4, and for the corresponding MELL (Multi-
plicative Exponential Linear Logic) subsystems [13, 12].
At the time we presented such systems, it was not possible to extend
them to full modal logics from K to S4, since the simple notion of level of a
formula does not interact well with reduction in presence ♦ rules.
The problem, instead, does not show up if, instead of natural deduction,
we consider 2–Sequents—see e.g. [9, 10, 8] where the authors show how 2–
Sequents are a suitable framework to deal with full MELL (and other linear
systems) both in sequent calculi, and proof nets.
More recently, the approach based on 2–Sequents has been extended in
order to deal with linear and branching time time temporal logics [5, 2]. In
particular for temporal logics it was necessary to properly extend the notion
of level of formulas, since natural numbers do not suffice.
Finally, the paradigm of 2–Sequents has been reformulated by Lellman
and coauthors, under the name of Linear–Nested–Sequents [11, 22], in order
to deal with an interesting class of modal logics.
Unfortunately, 2–Sequents/Linear–Nested–Sequents cannot be directly trans-
lated in a natural deduction setting, since the simple decoration of formulas
with natural numbers does not agree with the obvious definition of reduc-
tion. To overcome these problems, the simple (simplistic) notion of level has
to be generalised to that of position, a kind of spatial coordinate for each
formula.
Content of the paper
The paper deals with the normal modal logics varying from K to S4. We give
both a classical and intuitionistic formulation, for which we prove soundness
and completeness with respect to the axiomatic formulation, passing through
a suitable Kripke style semantics. For the intuitionistic versions, we define a
notion of reduction and we give a syntactical proof of normalization, along
the lines of the analogous proof for standard natural deduction. As usual,
consistency is obtained syntactically, as a by-product of normalization. We
conclude with a more detailed discussion of the labelled systems approach
to modal natural deduction and some considerations about obtained results
and future work.
2 Preliminary Notions
As mentioned in the Introduction, formula occurrences will be labeled with
positions—sequences of uninterpreted tokens. We introduce here the nota-
tion and operations that will be needed for such notions.
4Given a set X, X∗ is the set of ordered finite sequences on X. With
〈x1, ..., xn〉 we denote the finite non empty sequence s.t. x1, . . . , xn ∈ X;
〈 〉 is the empty sequence.
The (associative) concatenation of sequences : X∗×X∗ → X∗ is defined
as
• 〈x1, ..., xn〉〈z1, ..., zm〉 = 〈x1, ..., xn, z1, ..., zm〉,
• s〈 〉 = 〈 〉s = s.
For s ∈ X∗ and x ∈ X, we sometimes write sx for s〈x〉; and x ∈ s as
a shorthand for ∃t, u ∈ X∗. s = t〈x〉u. The set X∗ is equipped with the
following successor relation
s /X t⇔ ∃x ∈ X. t = s〈x〉
We use the following notations:
• /0X denotes the reflexive closure of /X ;
• @X denotes the transitive closure of /X ;
• vX denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of /X ;
Given three sequences s, u, v ∈ X∗ the prefix replacement s[u  v] is so
defined
s[u  v] =
{
vt if s = ut
s otherwise
When u and v have the same length, the replacement is called renaming
of u with v.
3 Natural deduction calculi
The propositional modal language L contains the following symbols:
– countably infinite proposition symbols, p0, p1, . . .;
– the propositional connectives ∨,∧,→,⊥;
– the modal operators ,♦;
– the auxiliary symbols ( and ).
As usual, ¬A is a shorthand for A→ ⊥.
Definition 3.1. The set mf of propositional modal formulas of L is the least
set that contains the propositional symbols and is closed under application of
the propositional connectives and the modal operators. A formula is atomic
if it is a propositional symbol, or the connective ⊥.
5In the following T denotes a denumerable set of tokens, ranged by meta-
variables x, y, z, possibly indexed. Let T ∗ be the set of the sequences on T ,
called positions; meta-variables α, β, γ range on T ∗, possibly indexed.
Definition 3.2. A position-formula (briefly p-formula) is an expression of
the form Aα, where A is a modal formula and α ∈ T ∗. We denote with pf
the set of position formulas.
Given a sequence Γ of p-formulas, Init[Γ] is the set of prefixes of the
positions in Γ:
{β : ∃Aα ∈ Γ. β v α}.
3.1 A class of normal modal systems
We briefly recall the axiomatic (“Hilbert-style”) presentation of normal
modal systems. Let Z be a set of formulas. The normal modal logic M[Z]
is defined as smallest set X of formulas verifying the following properties:
(i) Z ⊆ X
(ii) X contains all instances of the following schemas:
1. A→ (B → A)
2. (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
3. ((¬B → ¬A)→ ((¬B → A)→ B))
K. (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
MP if A,A→ B ∈ X then B ∈ X;
NEC if A ∈ X then A ∈ X.
We write `M[Z] A for A ∈ M[Z]. If N1, .., Nk are names of schemas,
the sequence N1 . . . Nk denotes the set [N1] ∪ ... ∪ [N1], where [Ni] = {A :
A is an instance of the schema Ni}. Figure 1 lists the standard axioms for
the well-known modal systems K, D, T, K4, S4; we use M as a generic name
for one of these systems.
We will call D, T and S4 total modal logics, since in their well known
Kripke semantics the accessibility relation is total. Instead, we will call K
and K4 partial modal logics.
4 Natural Deduction Systems
In this section we define natural deduction systems for the class of logics we
previously introduced.
6Axiom schema Logic
D A→ ♦A
T A→ A
4 A→ A
K = M[∅]
D = M[D]
T = M[T]
K4 = M[4]
S4 = M[T, 4]
Figure 1: Axioms for systems K, D, T, K4, S4
4.1 Total logics
We start by defining the system NS4
The set of derivations from a set Γ of assumptions is defined as the least
set that contains Γ and is closed under application of the following rules
(where, as usual, a formula into square brackets represents a discharged
assumption):
Logical rules
···
Aα
···
Bα
(∧I)
A ∧Bα
···
A ∧Bα
(∧1E)
Aα
···
A ∧Bα
(∧2E)
Bα
···
Aα
(∨1I)
A ∨Bα
···
Bα
(∨2I)
A ∨Bα
···
A ∨Bα
[Aα]···
Cβ
[Bα]···
Cβ
(∨E)
Cβ
[Aα]···
Bα
(→ I)
A→ Bα
···
A→ Bα
···
Aα
(→ E)
Bα
[¬Aα]···
⊥β
(⊥c)
Aα
···
⊥β
(⊥i)
Aα
7In ⊥i, A is atomic; moreover, when A is ⊥ we require α 6= β.
···
Aαx
(I)
Aα
···
Aα
(E)
Aαβ
In the rule I, one has αx 6∈ Init[Γ], where Γ is the set of (open)
assumptions on which Aαx depends.
···
Aαβ
(♦I)
♦Aα
···
♦Aα
[Aαx]···
Cβ
(♦E)
Cβ
In the rule ♦E, one has αx 6∈ Init[Γ], where Γ is the set of (open)
assumptions on which Cβ depends, with the exception of the discharged
assumptions Aαx.
It is easy to show the admissibility of the following rule, where the re-
quirement of atomicity of the conclusion is removed:
···
⊥β
(⊥i-ext)
Aα
for Aα 6= ⊥β.
On the basis of NS4, the natural deduction systems for the logics T and
D can be obtained by imposing suitable constraints on the application of
E and ♦I rules, as shown in the following table.
name of the calculus constraints on the rules E and ♦I
NS4 no constraints
NT β = 〈 〉
ND β is a singleton sequence 〈z〉
Let N be one of NT, ND, NS4; as usual we write Γ `N Aα if there is a
deduction Π in N with conclusion Aα, whose non discharged assumptions
appear in Γ.
Definition 4.1 (Proper Token). We refer to the token x that explicitly ap-
pears in any of the rules I, ♦E as to the proper token of the corresponding
rule. We say that a token is proper in a derivation if it is the proper token
of some I, ♦E rule in the derivation.
8By token renaming we can we can prove the following (see [26, Vol. 2,
pag. 529] for the analogous proof for proper variables):
Proposition 4.2. Let Γ `N Aα. Then there exists a deduction of Aα from
Γ in the system N such that
1. each proper token is the proper token of exactly one instance of I or
♦E rule;
2. the proper token of any instance of I rule occurs only in the sub-
derivation above that instance of the rule;
3. the proper token of any instance of ♦E rule occurs only in the sub-
derivation above the minor premiss of that instance of the rule.
Definition 4.3 (Token condition). A deduction satisfying conditions 1–3 of
Proposition 4.2 is said to satisfy the token condition.
By Proposition 4.2 we can always assume that all deductions satisfy the
token condition.
We denote by Π[β  γ] the tree obtained by replacing each position α in
a deduction Π with α[β  γ].
Remark 4.1. If the following holds:
1. Π is a deduction satisfying the token condition;
2. x is a token that is not a proper token of Π;
3. β is a position not containing any proper token of Π;
then Π[β  γ] is a deduction satisfying the token condition.
Notice that if the last rule of Π is ⊥i, and the last formula is ⊥α for
some α, it might be the case that, after the token substitution, the side
condition of this ⊥i application is no longer satisfied (that is, its premise
and conclusion are both ⊥δ, for the same δ). In such a case by Π[β  γ]
we mean the deduction obtained by deleting, after the substitution, the
last—incorrect—application of ⊥i.
We want to make sense of the deduction Π[β  γ] even when the con-
ditions of Remark 4.1 are not satisfied. Notice that if Π is a deduction
satisfying the token condition, we can replace all proper tokens in Π by new
tokens, to obtain a deduction Π′ of the same formula from the same assump-
tions, and such that t and x satisfy all the conditions of Remark 4.1. Hence
we define Π[β  γ] as this Π′[β  γ]. In the sequel we will implicitly assume
that by Π[β  γ] we actually mean Π′[β  γ] for some Π′ as above.
94.2 Weak Completeness
We prove a Weak Completeness theorem passing through some auxiliary
results.
Proposition 4.4.
1. Let N be one of the systems ND, NT, NS4: `N ♦A↔ ¬¬A〈〉;
2. Let N be one of the systems ND, NT, NS4: `N (A→ B)→ (A→ B)〈〉;
3. Let N be one of the systems ND, NS4: `N A→ A〈〉;
4. Let N be one of the systems NT, NS4: `N A→ ♦A〈〉;
5. `NS4 A→ A〈〉;
Proof.
1.
[♦A〈〉]
[Ax]
[¬A〈〉]
E¬Ax → E⊥x → I¬¬A〈〉
♦E¬¬A〈〉 → I
♦A→ ¬¬A〈〉
[¬♦Ax]
[Ax]
♦I
♦A〈〉 → E⊥〈〉 → I¬Ax
I
¬A [¬¬A〈〉]→ E⊥〈〉 ⊥c♦A〈〉 → I¬¬A→ ♦A〈〉
2.
[A〈〉]
E
Ax
[(A→ B)]〈〉
E
A→ Bx → E
Bx
I
B〈〉 → I
A→ B〈〉 → I
(A→ B)→ (A→ B)〈〉
3.
[A〈〉]
E
A〈〉 → I
A→ A〈〉
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4.
[A〈〉]
E
Ax
♦I
♦A〈〉 → I
A→ ♦A〈〉
5.
[A〈〉]
E
Axy
I
Ax
I
A〈〉 → I
A→ A〈〉
Closure under NEC is obtained by showing that all positions in a
provable sequent may be “lifted” by any prefix. Observe first that, for
Γ = Aγ11 , . . . , A
γn
n , we have Γ[〈〉  β] = Aβγ11 , . . . , Aβγnn .
Proposition 4.5 (lift). Let N be one of the systems ND, NT, NS4, and let
β be a position. If Γ `N Aα, then Γ[〈〉  β] `N Aβα.
Proof. Standard induction on derivation (with suitable renaming of proper
tokens). It is easily verified that the constraints on the modal rules remain
satisfied.
Corollary 4.6. Let N be one of the systems ND, NT, NS4.
If `N A〈 〉, then `N A〈 〉.
Finally, closure under MP is trivially ensured by rule (→ E).
Theorem 4.7 (weak completeness). Let M be one of the modal systems D,
T, S4. If `M A, then `NM A〈〉.
5 Partial logics
The treatment of partial logics K and K4 is delicate and requires the in-
troduction of auxiliary notions to soundly define their formal system and
prove proof-theoretic results. To motivate the formal systems for K and
K4, it could be useful to anticipate that, in the semantics we will define in
Section 6, positions will be mapped into nodes of a Kripke structure.
Recall that both K and K4 are complete with respect to the class of
models where the accessibility relation is not always defined. This means
that the correspondence between positions and nodes could be undefined at
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some position, a situation reminiscent of the case of first order logic with
undefined terms1. In fact, we will treat this case with an existence predicate
for positions, a tool introduced by D. Scott in the late seventies [24] to deal
with empty domains, and therefore with partially defined terms. For a first
order logic term t, the predicate E(t) has the following intuitive meaning: t
is defined2.
The natural deduction systems introduced in the previous section are
now expanded with formulas of the form E(α), where α is any position and
which we informally read as: α denotes an existing node/object. Such for-
mulas E(α) may be used only as premises in deductions. The only modified
rules w.r.t. the previously introduced formal system are the modal ones.
Rules for  are the following:
[E(αx)]···
Aαx
(I)
Aα
···
Aα E(αβ)
(E)
Aαβ
where in the rule I, αx 6∈ Init[Γ], where Γ is the set of (open) assumptions
on which Aαx depends.
Rules for ♦ are the following:
···
Aαβ E(αβ)
(♦I)
♦Aα
···
♦Aα
[Aαx] [E(αx)]···
Cβ
(♦E)
Cβ
where in rule ♦E, αx 6∈ Init[Γ], where Γ is the set of (open) assumptions on
which Cβ depends, with the exception of the discharged assumptions Aαx.
These “generic” rules are further constrained to take into account the
specifics of the systems K4 and K. The following table gives such constraints
for the systems NK4 and NK.
name of the calculus constraints on the rules E and ♦I
NK4 β is a non empty sequence
NK β is a singleton sequence 〈z〉
1The formal analogy between variables/terms and tokens/positions (and hence between
quantifiers and modalities) is one of the leitmotive of the 2-sequents approach, as it is
evident from the shape of the modal rules.
2For an extensive treatment of existence predicates for first order natural deduction,
see the two volumes [26], or the review [1].
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5.1 Weak Completeness
We prove a Weak Completeness Theorem also for partial logics.
Proposition 5.1.
1. Let N be one of the systems NK,NK4, `N ♦A↔ ¬¬A〈〉;
2. Let N be one of the systems NK,NK4, `N (A→ B)→ (A→ B)〈〉;
3. `NK4 A→ A〈〉;
Proof. In the following derivations, observe the interplay between modal
introduction and elimination, which allows to discharge all existence predi-
cates.
1.
[♦A〈〉]
[Ax]
[¬A〈〉][E(x)]
E¬Ax → E⊥x → I¬¬A〈〉
♦E¬¬A〈〉 → I
♦A→ ¬¬A〈〉
[¬♦Ax]
[Ax][E(x)]
♦I
♦A〈〉 → E⊥〈〉 → I¬Ax
I
¬A [¬¬A〈〉]→ E⊥〈〉 ⊥c♦A〈〉 → I¬¬A→ ♦A〈〉
2.
[A〈〉][E(x)]
E
Ax
[(A→ B)]〈〉[E(x)]
E
A→ Bx → E
Bx
I
B〈〉 → I
A→ B〈〉 → I
(A→ B)→ (A→ B)〈〉
3.
[A〈〉][E(xy)]
E
Axy
I
Ax
I
A〈〉 → I
A→ A〈〉
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Closure under NEC and under MP is shown in the same manner as for
the total systems. Therefore:
Theorem 5.2 (weak completeness). Let M be one of the modal systems K
and K4. If `M A then `NM A〈〉.
6 Semantics
We introduce in this section a tree-based Kripke semantics for our modal
systems, in order to prove their completeness with respect to the standard
axiomatic presentations.
6.1 Trees and Tree-semantics
Let N ∗ be the set of finite sequences of natural numbers with the partial
order vN as defined in Section 2.
Definition 6.1. A tree is a subset Θ of N ∗ s.t. 〈 〉 ∈ Θ; and if t ∈ Θ and
s vΘ t, then s ∈ Θ, where vΘ is the restriction of vN to Θ.
The elements of Θ are called nodes; a leaf is a node with no successors.
Given a tree Θ and s ∈ Θ, we define Θs (the subtree of Θ rooted at s) to be
the tree defined as: s′ ∈ Θs ⇔ ss′ ∈ Θ. Observe that Θ〈 〉 = Θ. In this
section, s and t will range over the generic elements (nodes) of Θ.
If At is the set of proposition symbols of our modal language, a Kripke
model is a triple M = 〈Θ, ν,R〉, where Θ is a tree, ν : Θ → 2At is an
assignment of proposition symbols to nodes, and R ⊆ Θ×Θ. Given a modal
system M ∈ {K,D,T,K4,S4}, a M-model is a Kripke modelMM = 〈Θ, ν,R〉
s.t.
modal system conditions on Θ conditions on R
K no condition R = /Θ
D Θ does not have leaves R = /Θ
T no condition R = /0Θ
K4 no condition R =@Θ
S4 no condition R =vΘ
The satisfiability relation of formulas on a Kripke model is standard; e.g.,
for a model M and node s, M, s |= A ⇔ ∀t.sRt ⇒M, t |= A. As usual,
we write M |= A, when M, s |= A for all nodes s of M.
Theorem 6.2 (standard completeness). For each modal system M in K, D,
T, K4, S4, and for every formula A, `M A ⇔ for all M–model M, we have
M |= A.
In the following, semantics definitions and the soundness theorem are
given separately for total logics (Section 6.2) and for partial logics (Sec-
tion 6.3).
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6.2 Semantics: Total logics
Definition 6.3 (Structures). Let M ∈ {D,T,S4} be a modal system. A 2M
structure is a pair SΘ = 〈MΘ, ρ〉 where:
• MΘ is an M–model 〈Θ, ν, R〉
• ρ : T ∗ → Θ is a map from positions to nodes (the evaluation).
Moreover for α ∈ T ∗, and for a fixed ρ, with `[α] we denote an evalu-
ation `[α] : T ∗ → Θρ(α).
Depending on the specific modal system, ρ has to satisfy the following,
additional constraints:
modal system conditions on ρ
D ρ is total & (α /T ∗ β ⇒ ρ(α) /Θ ρ(β))
T ρ is total & (α /T ∗ β ⇒ ρ(α) /0Θ ρ(β))
S4 ρ is total & (α /T ∗ β ⇒ ρ(α) vΘ ρ(β))
The satisfiability relation  between a 2-structure and a position formula
is defined in the following way:
MΘ, ρ  Aα ⇔MΘ, ρ(α) |= A,
where |= is the standard satisfiability relation w.r.t. modal Kripke semantics.
Finally, given a modal system M, we define the notion of logical conse-
quence for positions formulas. Let M be one of the systems {T,D,S4}:
Γ M Aα ⇔ ∀〈MΘ, ρ〉.(∀Bα ∈ ΓMΘ, ρ  Bα)⇒MΘ, ρ  Aα.
We now introduce some notation for the semantical substitution of values
into the evaluation functions ρ, in correspondence of specific subtrees. For
t ∈ Θ and `[α], define
ρ{αx/`[α]}(β) =
{
ρ(β) if β 6= αxγ
ρ(α)`[α](xγ) otherwise
We define the following set of Θ elements:
• ΘD = {t : |t| = 1};
• ΘT = {t : |t| ≤ 1};
• ΘS4 = {t : |t| ≥ 0}.
As for other notations, we will write ΘM for any of these sets.
Let us now fix a specific structure 〈MΘ, ρ〉; we have the following.
15
Lemma 6.4. Let M ∈ {D,T,S4}.
1. MΘ, ρ  Aα ⇔ ∀`[α].MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]} |= Aαx;
2. MΘ, ρ  ♦Aα ⇔ ∃`[α].MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]} |= Aαx.
Proof.
MΘ, ρ  Aα
⇔
MΘ, ρ(α) |= A
⇔
∀t,MΘ, ρ(α)t ∈ Θ⇒ ρ(α)t |= A
⇔
∀`[α].MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]}(αx) |= A
⇔
MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]}  Aαx.
Let vRu in a tree Θ, we define the subtraction operation ÷ between
nodes as: v ÷ u = t⇔ ut = v
Lemma 6.5. Let `[α] be an evaluation s.t. `[α](x) = ρ(αβ)÷ ρ(α), then
MΘ, ρ |= Aαβ ⇔MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]} |= Aαx.
Proof. Observe that ρ{αx/`[α]} = ρ(α)`[α](x) = ρ(α)(ρ(αβ) ÷ ρ(α)) =
ρ(αβ); therefore
MΘ, ρ  Aαβ
⇔
MΘ, ρ(αβ) |= A
⇔
MΘ, ρ{αx/`[Θα]}(αx) |= A
⇔
MΘ, ρ{αx/`[Θα]}  Aαx.
We are finally in the position to prove the soundness theorem, by an
easy induction on proofs which—we remark once again—strictly mimics the
standard proof of soundness for first order natural deduction. In the rest of
the paper with hp(Π) we denote the set of undischarged hypoteses of the
deduction Π. We write
Π
Aα
R
for Π is a deduction of formula Aα whose last rule is R.
Theorem 6.6 (soundness 1). Let M ∈ {D,T,S4} be a modal system.
If Γ `NM Aα then Γ M Aα.
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Proof sketch. Let M ∈ {D,T,S4} and assume that in NM
Π
Aα
R
We prove by induction on the length of Π, for each Γ such that hp(Π) ⊆ Γ,
that Γ M Aα. We discuss only the cases where R is I or E.
(I) Let Π be
Π′
Aαx
Aα
We observe first that the rule is the same for all the systems under
consideration, and that αx 6∈ Init[hp(Π′)], with hp(Π′) ⊆ Γ.
By IH we have: ∀MΘ, ρ.MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒MΘ, ρ  Aαx
⇔ (by the genericity of ρ)
MΘ, ρ, `[α].MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]}  hp(Π′),⇒MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]}  Aαx
⇔ (since MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]}  hp(Π′)⇔MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′))
∀MΘ, ρ.(MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒ ∀`[α],MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]}  Aαx.
⇔ (by Lemma 6.4)
∀MΘ, ρ.(MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒MΘ, ρ  Aα).
(E) Let Π be
Π′
Aα
Aαβ
The rule have different constraints in different systems; we deal with
the NS4 case, the others being similar or easier.
We know that hp(Π′) ⊆ Γ, therefore by IH
∀MΘ, ρ.MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒MΘ, ρ  Aα
⇔ (by Lemma 6.4)
∀MΘ, ρ, `[α].MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒ ρ{αx/`[α]}  Aαx
⇒ (by taking `[α] s.t. `[α](x) = ρ(αβ)÷ ρ(α))
∀MΘ, ρ,MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒ ρ{αx/`[α]}  Aαx
⇒ (by Lemma 6.5)
∀MΘ, ρ,MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒ ρ  Aαβ
Corollary 6.7. Let M ∈ {D,T,S4} be a modal system. If `NM Aα, then in
the Hilbert-style presentation of M we have `M A.
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6.3 Semantics: Partial logics
We now extend the semantical definitions and results of the previous section
to the partial systems K and K4. In particular, ρ could be undefined on
some position. Therefore, with respect to the semantics we have given in
Section 6.2:
1. ρ : T ∗ ⇀ Θ is a partial function;
2. `[α] : T ∗ ⇀ Θρ(α) is a partial function;
3. the substitution ρ{αx/`[α]} is undefined whenever it formally contains
an undefined subexpression.
We write ρ(x) ↓ and `[α](x) ↓ when the functions ρ and `[α] are defined
on input x. We require that ρ(γ)↓ ⇒ ∀β v γ.ρ(β)↓, and `[α](β)↓ ⇒ ∀β v
γ.`[α](β) ↓. The constraints on evaluations for K and K4 are given in the
following table.
modal system conditions on ρ
K (α /T ∗ β & ρ(α)↓ & ρ(β)↓)⇒ ρ(α) /Θ ρ(β)
K4 (α /T ∗ β & ρ(α)↓ & ρ(β)↓)⇒ ρ(α) @Θ ρ(β)
Since ρ is partial, we now need two different notions of satisfiability: `
for assumption formulas, and r for conclusion formulas. Define then, for a
2M structure 〈MΘ, ρ〉:
• MΘ, ρ ` Aα ⇔ (ρ(α)↓ & MΘ, ρ(α) |= A);
• MΘ, ρ r Aα ⇔ (ρ(α)↓ ⇒MΘ, ρ(α) |= A).
Semantics of the existence predicate E() justifies its name:
MΘ, ρ l E(α)⇔ ρ(α)↓ .
Note that we do not need to define r for E(), since it is used only in
assumptions. Finally
Γ  Aα ⇔ ∀〈MΘ, ρ〉.(∀Bβ ∈ Γ, .MΘ, ρ l Bβ,∀E(δ) ∈ Γ.MΘ, ρ l E(δ)
⇒MΘ, ρ |=r Aα).
Finally define:
• ΘK = {t : |t| = 1};
• ΘK4 = {t : |t| > 0}.
As for other notations, we will write ΘM for any of these sets.
As for the case of total logics we have the following lemmas (the proofs
are simple adaptations of the previous ones).
Lemma 6.8. Let M ∈ {K,K4}.
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1. MΘ, ρ r Aα ⇔ ∀`[α].MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]} t Aαx;
2. MΘ, ρ r ♦Aα ⇔ ∃`[α].MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]} r Aαx.
Lemma 6.9. Let `[α] be an evaluation s.t. `[α](x) = ρ(αβ)÷ ρ(α), then
MΘ, ρ r Aαβ ⇔MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]} r Aαx.
The following lemma allows us to reuse with simple modifications the
soundness theorem we proved in the previous section.
Lemma 6.10. If αx 6∈ Init[Γ] and Γ,E(αx)  Aα then Γ  Aα.
Proof. Let us suppose that there exist MΘ and ρ′ s.t.
MΘ, ρ′ l Γ and MΘ, ρ′ 6r Aα.
By means of the previous lemmas we have that:
MΘ, ρ 6r Aα ⇔ ∃`[α].MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]} 6r Aαx.
Now this implies that ρ{αx/`[α]}(αx)↓.
Let ρ′′ = ρ{αx/`[α]}. Since αx 6∈ Init[Γ] we have an evaluation ρ′′ s.t.
MΘ, ρ′′ l Γ and ρ′′(αx)↓ and MΘ, ρ′′ 6r Aα,
which is a contradiction.
Theorem 6.11 (soundness 2). Let M ∈ {K,K4} be a modal system. If
Γ `NM Aα then Γ M Aα.
Proof sketch. Let M ∈ {K,K4}, and assume that in NM
Π
Aα
R
We prove by induction on the length of Π, for each Γ such that hp(Π) ⊆ Γ,
that Γ M Aα. We discuss only the cases where R is I or E.
(I) Let Π be
[E(αx)]
Π′
Aαx
Aα
By the same argument we used in Theorem 6.6, we have hp(Π′) 
Aα. By Lemma 6.10 we obtain the thesis: hp(Π′)−{E(αx)}  Aα.
(E) Let Π be
Π′
Aα E(αβ)
Aαβ
We deal with the NK4 case, the NK case being similar.
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We know that hp(Π′) ⊆ Γ, therefore by IH
∀MΘ, ρ.MΘ, ρ l hp(Π′)⇒MΘ, ρ r Aα
⇔ (by Lemma 6.8)
∀MΘ, ρ, `[α].MΘ, ρ  hp(Π′)⇒MΘ, ρ{αx/`[α]}  Aαx
⇒ (by taking `[α] s.t. `[α](x) = ρ(αβ)÷ ρ(α), which exists, since
we assume E(αβ), that is ρ(αβ)↓ )
∀MΘ, ρ,MΘ, ρ l hp(Π′)⇒ ρ{αx/`[α]} r Aαx
⇒ (by Lemma 6.9)
∀MΘ, ρ,MΘ, ρ l hp(Π′)⇒ ρ r Aαβ
7 Intuitionistic systems and normalization
We will deal in this section with the intuitionistic systems N iK, N iT, N iD,
N iK4, N iS4 obtained from NK, NT, ND, NK4, NS4, respectively, by dropping
the reductio ab absurdum rule ⊥c.
We write:
-
Bβ
Π
Aα
to say that Π is a deduction of Aα having some (possibly zero) occur-
rences of formula Bβ among its assumptions, and we write
-
Π
Aα
R
to say that Π is a deduction of formula Aα whose last rule is R.
In order to define the notion of normal form for a deduction, we must
first introduce the notions of contractions, reduction steps, and reduction
sequence (see, e.g., [7].)
7.1 Proper contractions
The relation B of proper contractibility between deductions is defined as
follows.3
3Since the conclusion of ⊥i is always atomic, we do not have contractions associated
to such a rule.
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Proper contractibility for N iT, N iD, N iS4 systems
Π1
Aα
Π2
Bα
A ∧Bα
Aα
B Π1
Aα
Π1
Aα
Π2
Bα
A ∧Bα
Bα
B Π2
Bα
Π1
Aα
A ∨Bα
[Aα]
Π2
Cβ
[Bα]
Π3
Cβ
Cβ
B
Π1
Aα
Π2
Cβ
Π1
Bα
A ∨Bα
[Aα]
Π2
Cβ
[Bα]
Π3
Cβ
Cβ
B
Π1
Bα
Π3
Cβ
[Aα]
Π1
Bα
A→ Bα
Π2
Aα
Bα
B
Π2
Aα
Π1
Bα
Π
Aαx
Aα
Aαβ
B Π[αx  αβ]
Aαβ
Π1
Aαβ
♦Aα
[Aαx]
Π2
Cγ
Cγ
B
Π1
Aαβ
Π2[αx  αβ]
Cγ
Proper contractibility for N iK, N iK4 systems The same propositional con-
tractions of the previous systems; the modal ones are adapted as fol-
lows.
[E(αx)]
Π
Aαx
Aα E(αβ)
Aαβ
B
E(αβ)
Π[αx  αβ]
Aαβ
Π1
Aαβ E(αβ)
♦Aα
[Aαx] [E(αx)]
Π2
Cγ
Cγ
B
Π1
Aαβ E(αβ)
Π2[αx  αβ]
Cγ
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7.2 Commutative contractions
In this subsection, we denote by
Π1
Cβ Π2
R
Dγ
a deduction ending with an elimination rule R whose major premiss is for-
mula Cβ. We further extend the relation B by adding the following com-
mutative contractions:
Commutative contractions for N iT, N iD, N iS4 systems
Π1
A ∨Bα
[Aα]
Π2
Cβ
[Bα]
Π3
Cβ
Cβ Π4
R
Dγ
B Π1
A ∨Bα
[Aα]
Π2
Cβ Π4
R
Dγ
[Bα]
Π3
Cβ Π4
R
Dγ
Dγ
Π1
♦Aα
[Aαx]
Π2
Cβ
Cβ Π3
R
Dγ
B Π1
♦Aα
[Aαx]
Π2
Cβ Π3
R
Dγ
Dγ
Commutative contractions for N iK, N iK4 systems The same propositional
commutative contractions of the previous systems; the modal ones are
adapted as follows.
Π1
♦Aα
[Aαx] [E(αx)]
Π2
Cβ
Cβ Π3
R
Dγ
B Π1
♦Aα
[Aαx] [E(αx)]
Π2
Cβ Π3
R
Dγ
Dγ
Remark 7.1. It is easy to verify that contractions transform deductions into
deductions. Furthermore, they all preserve the token condition.
Definition 7.1 (Reducibility between Deductions).
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1. The relation  of immediate reducibility between deductions is the
“context closure” of B, defined as follows: Π1Π2 if and only if there
exist deductions Π3 and Π4 such that Π3 BΠ4 and Π2 is obtained by
replacing Π3 with Π4 in Π1.
2. The relation
∗ of reducibility is the transitive and reflexive closure of
.
7.3 Normalization
The results of the following section apply to all the intuitionistic systems
previously stated.
Definition 7.2 (Normal forms and normalizable deductions). A deduction
Π is
1. in normal form if there is no deduction Π′ such that ΠΠ′;
2. normalizable if there is a deduction Π′ s.t. Π
∗ Π′ and Π′ is in normal
form.
Definition 7.3 (Segments and Endsegments). Let Aα be a p-formula.
1. A finite sequence (Aαi)i≤m of occurrences of Aα in a deduction Π is a
segment (of length m+ 1) if:
(a) Aα0 is not a conclusion of ∨E or ♦E;
(b) Aαm is not a minor premiss of ∨E or ♦E;
(c) for all i < m, Aαi is a minor premiss of ∨E or ♦E with conclusion
Aαi+1
2. A segment in a deduction is an endsegment if its last formula is the
last formula of the deduction.
We will denote segments with σ, possibly indexed. When we want to
highlight that a segment is made of occurrences of a formula Aα we will
write σ[Aα]. With |σ| we denote the length of the segment σ.
Given a deduction
Π
Aα
R, with little abuse of language we will say that a
deduction Π′ is a (main) premiss of rule R to mean that Π′ is a sub-deduction
of Π whose end-formula is a (main) premiss of the displayed application of
R.
Definition 7.4 (Degree of a formula). 1. The degree deg(A) of a modal
formula A is recursively defined as:
(a) deg(p) = 0 if p is a proposition symbol;
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(b) deg(¬A) = deg(A) = deg(♦A) = deg(A) + 1;
(c) deg(A∧B) = deg(A∨B) = deg(A→ B) = max{deg(A), deg(B)}+
1.
2. The degree deg(Aα) of formula Aα is just deg(A).
Definition 7.5 (Major/Minor Premisses and Conclusions). Let σ[Aα] =
Aα0 . . . A
α
m and R be a segment and an instance of a deduction rule in Π,
respectively. We say that:
• σ is the (major/minor) premiss of R, if Aαm is the (major/minor)
premiss of R;
• σ is conclusion of R, if Aα0 is the conclusion of R.
With δ(σ[Aα]) = d(A) we denote the degree of the segment σ[Aα].
Definition 7.6 (cut). 1. A cut in a derivation Π is a segment σ which is
conclusion of an introduction rule I∗ of a connective ∗, and principal
premiss of an elimination rule E∗ of the same connective.
2. A cut σ in Π is maximal if δ(σ) = max{δ(σ′) : σ′ is a cut in Π}.
3. A (maximal) cut formula is a (maximal) cut segment of length 1.
Let C[Π] be the set of cuts of Π. For the normalization theorem we will
use the lexicographic ordering between pairs of natural numbers4.
Theorem 7.7 (normalization). For each derivation Π there exists a deriva-
tion Π′ s.t. Π
∗ Π′ and Π′ is in normal form.
Proof. The proof is on well ordering induction on pairs (d, n) of natural
numbers. We associate to each derivation Π a pair (called rank) #[Π] =
(d, n) s.t.
• d = max{δ(σ) : σ ∈ C[Π]};
• n =∑σ∈C[Π],δ(σ)=d |σ|.
We then prove the following claim:
#[Π] > (0, 0)⇒ ∃Π′(Π ∗ Π′ & #[Π′] < #[Π]).
1. Let us suppose that #[Π] > (0, 0);
2. pick a maximal cut σ in Π s.t. the sub-derivation Π∗ ending with σ
(i.e. ending with the last occurrence of σ ) does not contain any other
maximal cut segment;
4 (n,m) < (p, q) if either n < p or (n = p and m < q)
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3. perform all possible commutative contractions with respect to the seg-
ment under consideration;
4. perform the relevant contraction.
The resulting derivation Π′ has a smaller rank w.r.t Π i.e. #[Π′] < #[Π].
Using the claim, since the lexicographic order is well founded, for each
derivation Π there exists a derivation Π′ s.t. Π
∗ Π′ and #[Π′] = (0, 0), i.e.
the thesis.
8 Consequences of normalization
Let us denote with N one of the previously stated classical systems, and
with N i the corresponding intuitionistic system.
Definition 8.1 (Spine). A finite sequence (Ai
αi)i≤m of formulas in a de-
duction is a spine if:
1. for all i < m, Ai
αi is immediately above Ai+1
si+1 ;
2. Am
αm is the end-formula of the deduction;
3. A0
α0 is an assumption (either discharged or undischarged);
4. for all i < m, Ai
αi is one of the following:
(a) main premiss of some elimination rule;
(b) premiss of some introduction rule;
(c) premiss of an application of ⊥i rule.
Spines in normal deductions have a nice structure. It is easy to prove
the following:
Proposition 8.2. A spine (Ai
αi)i≤n in a normal deduction can be divided
into three subsequences:
1. an elimination sequence (Ai
αi)i≤m where each Aiαi , i < m, is main
premiss of some elimination rule;
2. a minimum sequence (Ai
si)m<i≤m+k where each Aiαi , m < i < m+ k
is premiss of ⊥i;
3. an introduction sequence (Ai
αi)m+k≤i≤n where each Aiαi , m+k < i <
n is premiss of some introduction rule.
In particular, in a normal deduction whose last rule is not an introduc-
tion there is a unique spine. The spine does not contain the introduction
sequence.
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As an immediate consequence we have the following Consistency Theo-
rem:
Theorem 8.3 (Consistency). For each position α, 6`N i ⊥α.
8.1 A translation of the classical calculi into the intuitionistic
ones
To obtain consistency of the classical systems, we adapt Go¨del’s double nega-
tion translation to our setting. As usual, A ↔ B is an abbreviation for
(A→ B) ∧ (B → A).
We inductively define a map g between modal formulas as follows:
g(⊥) = ⊥;
g(A) = ¬¬A for atomic A distinct from ⊥;
g(A ∨B) = ¬(¬g(A) ∧ ¬g(B));
g(A]B) = g(A) ] g(B) when ] is a binary connective distinct from ∨;
g(A) = g(A);
g(♦A) = ¬¬g(A);
Proposition 8.4. For every modal formula A and every position α,
`N (A↔ g(A))α.
Definition 8.5 (Negative Formulas). A modal formula is negative if it is
constructed from ⊥ or from atomic formulas by means of , ∧, →.
Lemma 8.6. Let A be a negative formula constructed from doubly negated
atomic formulas or from ⊥. Then, for all positions α
`N i (A↔ ¬¬A)α.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A.
• For the basis, recall that if A is either⊥ or a doubly negated atomic for-
mula then A is provably equivalent to ¬¬A in an intuitionistic frame-
work.
• Concerning the induction step, we only examine some nontrivial cases.
A: Suppose the statement true for A. Then
`N i (A↔ ¬¬A)α
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for all positions s. Therefore, in order to prove the nontrivial
implication `N i (¬¬A→ A)α, it suffices to show that `N i
(¬¬A→ ¬¬A)α. The latter holds since
`N i (♦¬A→ ¬A)α and `N i (¬♦¬A→ ¬¬A)α
are true for all positions s, even with no assumption on A.
A→ B: Suppose `N i (B ↔ ¬¬B)α. Then `N i (¬¬(A→ B)↔ A→ ¬¬B)α
and
`N i (A→ ¬¬B ↔ A→ B)α. Hence
`N i (A→ B ↔ ¬¬(A→ B))α
for all positions s.
Remark 8.1. For every modal formula A, the formula g(A) satisfies the
assumptions of Lemma 8.6.
Remark 8.2. The following holds for any set Γ of formulas and formulas Aα
and Bβ: if Γ, Aα `N i Bβ then Γ,¬Bβ `N i ¬Aα.
We can now prove the following:
Proposition 8.7. For every family {Biαi : i ∈ I} of formulas and every
formula Aα
{Biαi : i ∈ I} `N Aα ⇔ {g(Bi)αi : i ∈ I} `N i g(A)α.
Proof. (⇐) Straightforward from Remark 8.4.
(⇒) By induction on the height of a deduction of Aα in N . We only
examine some nontrivial cases of the induction step.
(♦E) Suppose
. . . Bi
αi . . .····
♦Cβ
[Cβ⊕x] . . . Biαi . . .····
Aα
Aα
in N . Then (inductively) we get the deductions
. . . g(Bi)
αi . . .····
¬¬g(C)β
and
g(C)β⊕x . . . g(Bi)αi . . .····
g(A)α
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in N i. By Remark 8.2, Remark 8.1 and Lemma 8.6 we get the
following deduction in N i (we leave to the reader to check that
all side conditions of deduction rules are fulfilled):
[¬g(A)α] . . . g(Bi)αi . . .····
¬g(C)β⊕x
¬g(C)β
. . . g(Bi)
αi . . .····
¬¬g(C)β
⊥β
⊥α
¬¬g(A)α
····
¬¬g(A)→ g(A)α
g(A)α
(∨E) Suppose
. . . Bi
αi . . .····
B ∨ Cβ
[Bβ] . . . Bi
αi . . .····
Aα
[Cβ] . . . Bi
αi . . .····
Aα
Aα
in N .
By induction hypothesis and by Remark 8.2 we get the following
deductions in N i:
. . . g(Bi)
αi . . .····
¬(¬g(B) ∧ ¬g(C))β
¬g(A)α . . . g(Bi)αi . . .····
¬g(B)β
¬g(A)α . . . g(Bi)αi . . .····
¬g(C)β
From these deductions we can produce the following in N i:
. . . g(Bi)
αi . . .····
¬(¬g(B) ∧ ¬g(C))β
[¬g(A)α] . . . g(Bi)αi . . .····
¬g(B)β
[¬g(A)α] . . . g(Bi)αi . . .····
¬g(C)β
¬g(B) ∧ ¬g(C)β
⊥β
⊥α
¬¬g(A)α
We finally get the required deduction in N i from Lemma 8.6.
The other cases are easier.
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Corollary 8.8. For every formula Aα
`N Aα ⇔ `N i g(A)α.
Remark 8.3. Consistency of N follows immediately from Corollary 8.8.
9 Discussions
In this paper we defined natural deduction systems for normal modal logics,
ranging from the basic K to S4. We have provided both the classical and
the intuitionistic formulations. We followed the idea of the paradigm of
2-Sequents by Masini et al [12, 13, 4, 5, 2, 14, 15] and we introduced a
notion of position which, strictly speaking, represents the spatial coordinate
of a formula. For the intuitionistic versions of the systems, we defined proof
reduction and proved proof normalisation, thus obtaining a syntactical proof
of consistency. We lift the results of consistency to classical systems by
adapting Go¨del’s double negation translation. Natural deduction calculi
for partial logics (K and K4) are particularly challenging, and the sound
formulation of the deduction system requires the introduction of an existence
predicate a` la Scott [24].
Our aim was to retain the original intention of natural deduction, as
motivated by Prawitz [23]. In the following, we briefly discuss some cru-
cial differences between the framework we propose and labelled deduction
systems.
9.1 Labelled natural deduction systems: a comparison
We recall here some of the main features of labelled systems, one of the most
popular natural deduction formulations of modal logics. We focus on the
original systems, as proposed by Simpson [25] and, later, by Vigano` [27],
which are the original roots of the approach.
Both Simpson and Vigano` build on the well known translation (·)∗x that,
given a modal formula and a first order variable x, produces a first order
formula in a language with denumerable many unary predicate symbols
and one binary predicate symbol R (which is going to be modelled by the
accessibility relation in the Kripke model):
• (pi)∗x = Pi(x), where the pi-s and Pi-s are the i-th propositional and
the i-th predicate symbol, respectively;
• (⊥)∗x = ⊥ ;
• (A ◦B)∗x = (A)∗x ◦ (B)∗x, for each propositional connective ◦;
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• (A)∗x = ∀y(xRy → (A)∗y), for y a fresh variable.
As a result of this translation, Simpson and Vigano` proposed natural
deduction systems for a large class of modal logics, based on the explicit
introduction in the calculus of the accessibility relation, and a number of
rules governing them (each modal system is equipped with a characteristic
set of such rules.)
Main characteristics of these approaches are:
Simpson: all the deductions must have a modal formula as conclusion, and
the first order atomic formulas xRy are usable only as assumptions;
Vigano`: it is possible, by means of suitable rules, to built sub-derivations
composed only by relational formulas.
Both the approaches have strengths and some weaknesses.
Although we believe that from a foundational point of view Simpson’s
formulation is perhaps the most elegant, it has the serious defect of making
derivations very complex (de facto, not natural at all), and of having a large
number of commutative rules, in order to prove a normalization theorem.
Figure 2 gives a quick summary of Simpson’s calculus for K4. Observe, for
example, the “structural” rule R4, which shows the price that this approach
has to pay—the calculus includes structural rules governing the accessibil-
ity relation. Contrary to this, and following the foundational perspective
which originated natural deduction, our systems have only rules to intro-
duce/eliminate logical connectives, and not structural ones.
On the other hand, Vigano`’s formulation has the great gift of simplic-
ity. In particular, his proposal does not have structural rules in the system.
However, it is a calculus that mirrors too closely the first order axiomati-
zation of Kripke semantics. This is evident if we look at the proof of the
S4 formula at the bottom of Figure 3, where a subproof consisting only of
relational formulas has to be added.
These foundational weaknesses, of course, become strengths when ex-
pressivity comes into spotlight—both Simpson’s and Vigano`’s proposals ac-
commodate a very large class of complex modal and temporal logics [3, 6,
4, 16, 18, 19, 17, 20], and have been successively formulated also as sequent
calculi [21].
The previous discussion highlights how our point of view is different from
labelled calculi approach. We aim at a proof-theoretic foundation, in natural
deduction style, for basic modal logics, without structural rules and explicit
semantical notions, recovering in such a way the original spirit of natural
deduction.
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x :?
y :A
(?E)
x :A x :B
x :A^B (^I)
x :A^B
x :A
(^E1) x :A^B
x :B
(^E2)
x :A
x :A_B (_I1)
x :B
x :A_B (_I2)
x :A_B
[x :A]....
y :C
[x :B]....
y :C
y :C
(_E)
[x :A]
....
x :B
x :Aæ B (æI)
x :A æ B x :A
x :B
(æE)
[xRy]
....
y :A
x :§A (§I)
§ x :§A xRy
y :A
(§E)
y :A xRy
x :ßA (ßI)
x :ßA
[y :A] [xRy]
....
z :B
z :B (ßE)
†
§Restriction on (§I): y must be diÆerent from x and must not occur in any open
assumptions other than the distinguished occurrences of xRy.
†Restriction on (ßE): y must be diÆerent from both x and z and must not occur
in any open assumptions upon which z :B depends other than the distinguished
occurrences of y :A and xRy.
Figure 4–1: The basic modal natural deduction system, N .
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¬D 8x. 9y. xRy
¬T 8x. xRx
¬B 8xy. xRy æ yRx
¬4 8xyz. xRy ^ yRz æ xRz
¬5 8xyz. xRy ^ xRz æ yRz
¬2 8xyz. xRy ^ xRz æ 9w. yRw ^ zRw
Figure 4–3: Properties of the visibility relation.
[xRy]....
z :A
z :A
(RD)
§
[xRx]....
y :A
y :A
(RT )
xRy
[yRx]....
z :A
z :A
(RB)
xRy yRz
[xRz]....
w :A
w :A
(R4)
xRy xRz
[yRz]
....
w :A
w :A
(R5)
xRy xRz
[yRw] [zRw]
....
v :A
v :A (R2)
†
§Restriction on (RD): y must be diÆerent from both x and z and must not occur
in any open assumptions other than the distinguished occurrences of xRy.
†Restriction on (R2): w must be diÆerent from x,y,z, v and must not occur in any
open assumptions other than the distinguished occurrences of yRw and zRw.
Figure 4–4: Rules expressing properties of the visibility relation.
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1. (RT ).
[x :§A]2 [xRx]1
x :A
x :A
1
x :§Aæ A 2
2. (RB).
[xRy]2
[x :A]3 [yRx]1
y :ßA
y :ßA
1
x :§ß A
2
x :A æ § ßA 3
3. (R4).
[xRy]3 [yRz]2
[x :§A]4 [xRz]1
z :A
z :A
1
y :§A
2
x :§§A
3
x :§Aæ §§A 4
4. (R5).
[x :ßA]4
[xRy]3 [xRz]2
[z :A]2 [yRz]1
y :ßA
y :ßA
1
y :ßA
2
x :§ß A
3
x :ßA æ §ß A 4
5. (R2).
[x :ß§ A]4
[xRy]2 [xRz]3
[y :§A]2 [yRw]1
w :A [zRw]1
z :ßA
z :ßA
1
z :ßA
2
x :§ßA
3
x :ß§ A æ § ßA 4
Figure 4–5: Derivations using rules on the visibility relation.
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¶1
x :A1
¶2
x :A2
x :A1 ^A2
x :Ai
=) ¶ix :Ai
¶
x :Ai
x :A1 _A2
[x :A1]
¶1
y :B
[x :A2]
¶2
y :B
y :B
=)
¶
x :Ai
¶i
y :B
[x :A]
¶1
x :B
x :A æ B
¶2
x :A
x :B
=)
¶2
x :A
¶1
x :B
[xRy]
¶
y :A
x :§A xRy0
y0 :A
=)
xRy0
¶[y0/y]
y0 :A
¶1
y :A xRy
x :ßA
[y0 :A] [xRy0]
¶2
z :B
z :B
=)
¶1
y :A xRy
¶2[y/y
0]
z :B
Figure 7–1: Modal proper reductions.
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¶
x :?
y :A •
z :B
(r)
=)
¶
x :?
z :B
¶
x :ßA
[y :A] [xRy]
¶0
z :B
z :B •
w :C
(r)
=) ¶
x :ßA
[y :A] [xRy]
¶0
z :B •
w :C
(r)
w :C
¶
x :A_B
[x :A]
¶1
y :C
[x :B]
¶2
y :C
y :C •
z :D
(r)
=) ¶
x :A_B
[x :A]
¶1
y :C •
z :D
(r)
[x :B]
¶2
y :C •
z :D
(r)
z :D
R1[z/x] . . . Rn[z/x]
[R11[z/x]] . . . [R1n1[z/x]]
¶1
w :A . . .
[Rm1[z/x]] . . . [Rmnm[z/x]]
¶m
w :A
w :A •
w0 :B
(r)
=)
R1[z/x] . . . Rn[z/x]
[R11[z/x]] . . . [R1n1[z/x]]
¶1
w :A •
w0 :B
(r)
. . .
[Rm1[z/x]] . . . [Rmnm[z/x]]
¶m
w :A •
w0 :B
(r)
w0 :B
Figure 7–2: Modal permutative reductions.
Figure 2: The modal rules Simpson’s approach.
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x :?
y :A
(?E)
x :A x :B
x :A^B (^I)
x :A^B
x :A
(^E1) x :A^B
x :B
(^E2)
x :A
x :A_B (_I1)
x :B
x :A_B (_I2)
x :A_B
[x :A]....
y :C
[x :B]....
y :C
y :C
(_E)
[x :A]
....
x :B
x :Aæ B (æI)
x :A æ B x :A
x :B
(æE)
[xRy]
....
y :A
x :§A (§I)
§ x :§A xRy
y :A
(§E)
y :A xRy
x :ßA (ßI)
x :ßA
[y :A] [xRy]
....
z :B
z :B (ßE)
†
§Restriction on (§I): y must be diÆerent from x and must not occur in any open
assumptions other than the distinguished occurrences of xRy.
†Restriction on (ßE): y must be diÆerent from both x and z and must not occur
in any open assumptions upon which z :B depends other than the distinguished
occurrences of y :A and xRy.
Figure 4–1: The basic modal natural deduction system, N .
24 LABELLED NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS
Table 2.2. Some convergency properties of , corresponding character-
istic axiom schemas and Horn relational rules
Property Axiom schema Horn relational rule
Seriality
ser
Reflexivity
refl
Symmetry symm
Transitivity trans
Euclideaness eucl
Convergency conv1
conv2
Contextuality cxt
Density dens1
dens2
Where , and are (Skolem) function constants.
Definition 2.1.9 The labelled ND system for the propositional
modal logic is obtained by extending with a given Horn relational theory
.
Notation 2.1.10 We refer to the system also as ,
where is a string consisting of the standard names of the characteristic axioms
corresponding to the relational rules contained in .
Then, for example, the systems , , , and ,
and their synonyms , , , and , present the modal logics
, , , and .
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; the main (and only) track of , displayed with dotted lines, is .
trans
!
! ""
######
As a second example, consider the following normal -derivation of the char-
acteristic axiom , together with its underlying tree: the lwff-threads of are
and ; the tracks of , displayed with dotted lines,
are , which is also the main track of , and .
$$$ $$$
%%%%
We adapt the standard definition of subformula as follows.
Definition 2.3.10 is a subformula of iff (i) is ; or (ii) is and
is a subformula of or ; or (iii) is and is a subformula of . We say
that is a (labelled) subformula of iff is a subformula of .
Lemma 2.3.11 Let be a normal derivation, and let be a track , , ,
in . Then contains an lwff , called the minimal lwff, which separates
two possibly empty parts of , called the elimination part and the introduction part of
, where:
(i) each in the elimination part, i.e. , is amajor premise of an elimination
rule and contains as a subformula;
(ii) , provided that , is premise of an introduction rule or of ;
(iii) each in the introduction part except the last one, i.e. , is a
premise of an introduction rule and is a subformula of .
Figure 3: The modal rules of Vigan`’s appro ch.
